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Abstract
The keys which are generated by cryptography algorithms have still been 
compromised by attackers. So, they extra efforts to enhance security, time con-
sumption and communication overheads. Encryption can achieve confidentiality 
but cannot achieve integrity. Authentication is needed beside encryption technique 
to achieve integrity. The client can send data indirectly to the server through a 
covert channel. The covert channel needs pre-shared information between parties 
before using the channel. The main challenges of covert channel are security of 
pre-agreement information and detectability. In this chapter, merging between 
encryption, authentication, and covert channel leads to a new covert channel 
satisfying integrity and confidentiality of sending data. This channel is used for 
secure communication that enables parties to agree on keys that are used for future 
communication.
Keywords: encryption, authentication, dynamically, covert channel,  
confidentiality, algorithm, undetectability, fake key
1. Introduction
Encryption is considered the main key factor of security to achieve confi-
dentiality and to protect data from disclosure [1]. Encryption is not efficient to 
achieve integrity. It needs another factor called authentication [2]. Covert channel 
is created to transfer data indirectly between client and server; it was created by 
Lampson [3].
Before the client and server use the covert channel, they must agree on a pre-
agreement knowledge. Also, they agree on how to send that knowledge. A good 
example is they agree on even word meaning “00” and odd word meaning “11.” If 
the client sends “communication channels,” the server will know that the client’s 
message is “1100” [4, 5].
Covert channel cannot be detected if the following two factors exist: plausi-
bility and bit distribution. Plausibility deceives the attacker who thinks that  the 
channel is normal channel and it is not used to send secret information. On the 
other hand, the bit distribution of normal channel must same distribution of 
covert channel [5].
The technique is worked as shown in Figure 1, where it shows the general idea of 
the proposed technique. Covert channel needs shared information. In my protocol, 
it is considered as a table shared between the client and server. This table contains 
characteristics of the client such as the name which represents the original key. Each 
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original key has fake keys. I used encryption algorithm to guarantee the confidenti-
ality. HMAC is used to check integrity. Finally, the time that is needed for the client 
and server to agree on secret information (e.g., secret keys) is measured.
In this chapter, secure communication channel for transferring data is imple-
mented. The channel between the client and server is considered a covert channel 
that depends on authentication and encryption.
2. Background
Lampson was the first to introduce the idea of a covert channel [3]. Transferring 
data between two entities indirectly through a channel is called a covert channel. 
Before the client and server use the channel to transfer data, they must agree on 
a pre-agreement knowledge (e.g., shared memory, table). For example, a word 
containing “mm” means bit “0” other than this means bit “1.” So, if the client wants 
to send “10” to the server indirectly, the client will send “secure communication” to 
the server. The attacker hardly breaks the covert channel and it is considered to be 
more secure if it is undetectable [3, 4].
2.1 Covert channel characteristics and properties
Although a covert channel transfers information in a hidden way, it has the same 
characteristics as other communication channels. These characteristics are:
• Capacity: the amount of data that can be transmitted through the channel. 
From security viewpoint, increasing channel capacity leads to more informa-
tion leakage. The covert channel capacity is measured in bits/second. To obtain 
maximum bandwidth through a covert channel, encoding schemes must be 
chosen between the sender and receiver.
• Noise: transmitted data through a covert channel are exposed to an amount of 
perturbations that makes the transmitted and received information between 
two entities not the same.
• Transmission mode: the transmission of information in covert channels (as 
in normal channels) can be synchronous or asynchronous. The sender and 
receiver in synchronous mode should manage their transmission based on a 
condition or a specific event. On the other hand, in asynchronous mode, the 
transmission occurs without a prior condition.
Figure 1. 
Secure communication using covert channel, encryption, and authentication.
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2.2  The covert channel is more private and undetectable if it satisfies  
the following
1. Plausibility: the TCP is usually used for Internet traffic, and it always employs 
using time stamp option. As a result, TCP using time stamp is a plausible 
covert channel because the majority of users using TCP will not use it for send-
ing covert data. So, the adversary will believe that TCP time stamps will not be 
used for sending data covertly.
2. Undetectability: in order for a channel to be more undetectable, the channel 
must satisfy that the distribution of bits with covert data must be similar to 
the distribution of the normal channel. If an adversary notices that there are 
differences (using statistical tests) in bit distribution, then he will detect that 
the channel is a covert channel. Also, to achieve undetectability, the channel’s 
bits must be random; otherwise, it will be noticed by the adversary.
3. Indispensability: Lampson [3] reports that a communication channel is a 
covert channel if it is neither designed nor intended to transfer information at 
all. The channel should introduce several benefits to the users besides sending 
data covertly; thus, the adversary cannot or will not close off that channel.
2.3 Covert channel classification
Covert channels can be classified as storage or timing channels, noisy or noise-
less channels, and program-flow channels.
2.3.1 Storage channels and timing channels
The covert storage channel depends on a shared variable or a storage location, 
whereby one process (sender) can be allowed to write directly or indirectly to the 
storage location and the other process (receiver) reads from that storage location. 
On the other hand, the covert timing channel enables senders to send informa-
tion to the receiver through signals, whereby the sender manages the time that is 
needed to perform some operation in such a way that when the receiver observes the 
time, it will understand a special event or a special piece of information. The main 
disadvantage of the timing channel is that it is considered very noisy because of the 
several external factors that affect the execution time of a process. Covert storage 
channels and timing channels need a synchronization process, which enables the 
sender and receiver to synchronize with each other to send and receive information. 
The storage covert channel uses a data variable to enable the sender and receiver 
to communicate. Therefore, a synchronization variable, called sender-receiver, is 
needed by the sender to notify the receiver that he has completed reading or writing 
a data variable. The covert channel uses another synchronization variable, called 
receiver-sender. To distinguish between storage and timing channels, if a chan-
nel uses a storage variable to transfer data between the sender and receiver, it is 
considered a storage channel. On the other hand, a covert timing channel uses time 
reference (e.g., a clock) to transfer data between the sender and receiver, whereby 
the sender and receiver use a common time reference.
2.3.2 Noisy and noiseless channels
I discussed previously that the characteristics of the covert channel are similar to 
any communication channel. One of these characteristics is that the channel may be 
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noisy. The covert channel can be noiseless if the transmitted data by the sender and 
received data by the receiver are the same with probability 1; otherwise, the channel 
is noisy. Usually, data transmitted through a covert channel is represented by bit 
“0” or “1.” Nevertheless, if the receiver decodes every bit transmitted by the sender 
correctly, then the covert channel is considered noiseless. Thus, to reduce error rate, 
which is produced by noise, correction codes are used [6].
2.3.3 Program-flow channels
I present a new type of covert channel, which is program-flow. The program-flow 
covert channel depends on the flow of program execution to convey information. 
In our proposed covert channel, the sender tries to guess the correct delta_mmap 
(encoded information) of the vulnerable server program. The server code which 
executes in case of successful guess differs from which executes in a failed guess. The 
receiver distinguishes between server code executed in successful and failed guesses.
2.4 Authentication and key exchange
Authentication process identifies entities that are attempting to access some 
resources. Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm is used as method of public key 
exchange.
2.4.1 Authentication process
Authentication is a process of checking whether someone or something is autho-
rized or not to access some resources. Authentication can be computer to computer 
or process to process and mutual in both directions [7, 8]. Bob can authenticate 
Alice’s identity depending on four factors [7, 9], which are:
2.4.1.1 Something you know
Alice sends a request to the server to access some resources; Bob authenticates 
Alice by asking her about a secret thing that she knows, such as password. If Alice 
issues a correct password, then Bob will accept her request for accessing some 
resources. Fortunately, a password is needed to login into the system and access its 
resources. Yet, unfortunately, the user is always asked to reuse the password when 
he wants to log into the system, which gives attackers opportunities to hack the 
password and reuse it. The solution for this problem is to use a onetime password 
(OTP) so that the user each time she logs into a system needs a new password.
2.4.1.2 Something you have
One of the disadvantages of the first authentication factor (something you 
know) is that the user may forget his password. Thus, the second authentication 
factor (something you have) overcomes this problem, whereby the user has an 
object (e.g., automatic teller machine (ATM) cards, OTP cards [7], and smart cards 
[9]) to access the system. Unfortunately, the objects may get stolen by attackers.
2.4.1.3 Something you are
The third authentication factor is based on the measurements of the user’s 
physical characteristics such as the fingerprints, iris, and voice. The techniques that 
measure the behavioral characteristics of the user are called biometrics [7, 8]. This 
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factor overcomes the problems of the previous factors because it does not depend 
on a password or a token.
2.4.1.4 Somebody you know
Brainard et al. [9] proposes a fourth factor of authentication that is dependent 
on emergency authenticator, and it is used when the primary authenticator is 
unavailable to a user. A good example for emergency system is email; thus, when 
a user forgets his password, he often has the option of having password reset 
instructions. A system called “vouching” is introduced. A voucher system permits 
swapping of the roles of the token and PIN to deal with the case when the user has 
forgotten his PIN but still has his token.
2.4.2 Message authentication
When Alice and Bob want to exchange messages, they do not want an attacker 
to modify the contents of their messages. This can be achieved by using message 
authentication odes (MACs), where the MAC is a tag, attached to the message 
by Alice to Bob or vice versa. If Bob validates this tag, the request of Alice will be 
accepted by Bob; otherwise, it is rejected [7]. MAC that is based on cryptographic 
hash functions is called HMAC [10]. There are many hash functions, such as 
message digest 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1). When HMAC is 
used with MD5, it is called Hashed Message Authentication Code-Message Digest 
5 (HMAC-MD5), and when it is used with SHA1, it is called Hashed Message 
Authentication Code-Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (HMAC-SHA1) [7, 10, 11]. In our 
dissertation, we use the secure hash algorithm SHA256 with pre-shared key to form 
HMAC-SHA256, where the secure hash algorithm SHA256 takes a message of 512-
bit blocks as input and returns a digest message with 256 bits as output [7].
2.4.3 Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange algorithm
Key exchange algorithms are cryptographic methods that generate crypto-
graphic shared keys that are shared among users. After Alice and Bob agree on a 
shared key, they can use it in HMAC, and they can also use it in symmetric encryp-
tion algorithms to encrypt or to decrypt files. Alice encrypts file using one of the 
symmetric algorithms and sends it to Bob. Bob in turn uses the same symmetric 
algorithm to decrypt the file. Note that Alice and Bob must agree on a shared key 
before using symmetric algorithm. Many key agreement protocols have been 
proposed. The Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm [12] is a very popular example that 
introduces a key exchange protocol using the discrete logarithm problem [13]. DH 
algorithm enables Alice and Bob to exchange secure keys over an insecure channel.
Figure 2 shows the mechanism of DH. The values g and p are public parameters 
known to Alice and Bob, whereby p is a prime number and g (generator of p) is an 
integer less than p. This means that for all every number n between 1 and p-1, there 
is a power k of g such that n = gk mod p. Both Alice and Bob choose a secret random 
integer number, a and b, respectively. After that, Alice sends to Bob (gb mod p), 
and Bob sends to Alice (gb mod p). Finally, they agree on a secret key by using this 
formula ((ga)b mod p).
Figure 3 shows that a “man-in-the-middle” (Mallory) can listen and modify 
the conversation messages between Alice and Bob. In so doing, she can convince 
Alice and Bob that they are communicating with each other while in fact both are 
communicating with Mallory [7]. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that the main vulner-
ability in the DH protocol is that it does not have an authentication process. Several 
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versions of DH protocol exist to overcome this problem, for example, by using DH 
with digital signature [11]. Diffie et al. [14] enhance a Diffie-Hellman protocol with 
an authentication process, whereby Alice and Bob must authenticate themselves 
using a digital signature. Alice and Bob must have a pair of keys (public key and pri-
vate key) and a certificate for the public key. So, during execution of DH protocol, 
Alice and Bob transmit massages with signature; Mallory cannot forge the signature 
because she needs to share Alice’s private key and Bob’s private key.
The DH algorithm relies on heavy computation, which may not be suitable to 
resource-constrained platforms.
3. Related work
There are many researches that target covert channel undetectability [15–17], 
but most of the works have drawbacks and lack in channel detectability (Girling 
[18] in 1987). He creates three covert channels through a local area network (LAN): 
two of them are storage channels, and the third is a timing channel. The two storage 
channels depend on “what-is-sent” strategy, whereby one of them depends on the 
frame size, which is sent by the sender. If the frame size equals to 256, the amount 
of covert information decoded by receiver, who monitors the sender activity on the 
LAN, would be 8 bits. On the other hand, the timing channel depends on the time 
that represents the time interval between successive sends. The time difference 
between successive sends may be odd or even, and the prior agreement between 
the sender and receiver (who monitors the time between successive sends) is such 
Figure 2. 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. Alice and Bob agree on a secret key over an insecure channel. The 
secret key that they agree on is computed as (ga)b mod p.
Figure 3. 
A Diffie-Hellman weakness. A man-in-the-middle (e.g., Mallory) impersonates Alice to agree on a shared key 
with Bob. Also, she impersonates Bob to agree on a shared key with Alice.
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that the odd time means bit “0” and even time means bit “1.” So, the timing channel 
obviously depends on “when-is-sent” strategy.
TCP/IP protocol is used to create covert channel that is targeted by many 
researchers, where they used TCP to hide information [19–22]. Zhang et al. [6] 
propose covert channel to transfer messages to control (increasing or decreasing) 
the period of silence in traffic of VoLTE traffic. Create covert channel through 
hiding information in IP fields [20, 23]. Mead et al. [24] propose timing covert 
channel for wireless communication; they developed android application to com-
municate through local area network and mobile network. The results show that 
the channel is very undetectable in spite of the existence of malware and intrusion 
detection system.
Some researches, Fatayer et al. [15–17], try to use covert channel as benign chan-
nel, and it can be used to send legal information between the client and server. They 
used gaps in memory to create covert channel. Also, they used the channel to send 
text and audio files in acceptable time. The proposed technique depends on pre-
agreement database which consists of original keys and its corresponding fake keys. 
Each original key has multiple fake keys. The database consist of the characteristics 
of clients; each feature represents an original key, and it has multiple fake keys. 
Figure 4 figures out the pre-agreement between the client and server before using 
covert channel.
Customer asks cloud provider to access his resources. The summarization of 
approach is as follows. First, pre-agreement between the server and client is shown 
in Figure 4. Second, the customer sends a packet which contains “Fakei” attribute 
belongs to a specific customer (e.g., name) to the cloud provider. Third, the cloud 
provider will analyze the packet and make sure that the “Fakei” belongs to which 
customer. If yes, the provider goes to next step. Fourth, the cloud provider will 
ask for extra information to verify the customer and then he sends a packet that 
contains another fake key to the customer. Fifth, the customer receives the packet 
and he verifies the packet. The customer will send the required information to cloud 
provider such as one of the  fake keys of email. Seventh, the cloud provider will 
analyze the packet to make sure that the “Fakei” (email) belongs to which customer. 
If yes, the cloud provider will accept the request. Eight, steps from 4 to 7 are consid-
ered the first level of security, so if these steps are repeated more than one time, it 
can achieve multilevel of security.
A new detection approach of covert timing channel is proposed by Fahimeh 
et al. [25], where this approach enables to detect covet time channel through traffic 
distribution. They used statistical test to measure the network traffic online.
Figure 4. 
Database as pre-agreement between the client and server.
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4. Covert channel with authentication leads to secure communication
The proposed technique is responsible for creating secure communication chan-
nel using covert channel, encryption, and authentication. In the first step before 
using covert channel, the client and server must agree on pre-agreement table as 
shown in Figure 4, where it depicts out the pre-agreement table consisting of origi-
nal key (OK) and its corresponding fake keys. The key point here is that the fake key 
is used in communication channel and the original key is kept secret in both sides 
(client and server). Figure 5 illustrates the proposed technique, where the network 
consists of the client and server. The client agrees on shared information (e.g., table 
as database) with the server.
The client wants to send to the server a message. Then, he encrypts the message 
using the original key. After that the encrypted message is attached with the fake key 
to be a parameter to HMAC function. HMAC depends on shared key between the 
client and server. Then the client sends (HMAC + encrypted message + fake key) to 
the server. Where, HMAC is used for integrity and fake key for server to know the 
Figure 5. 
Technique for transferring secure data through covert channel using covert channel, encryption, and 
authentication.
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original key to decrypt the encrypted message. On the other hand, the server receives 
the client’s message. After that he separates the message to the HMAC, encrypted 
message, and fake key. Then, he checks the integrity of the message. After that he gets 
the original key from its corresponding fake key to decrypt the encrypted message.
5. Performance discussion
The implementation of technique is done by: first create a network as client and 
server with implemented java application. Client and server machines are 32 bit 
×86, CPU Core (TM) i5 2.40 GHz, and Ram 4GB. Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) [26] algorithm is used in the implementation. Hashed message authentica-
tion code (HMAC) is used to guarantee the integrity [7, 11, 12]. The following issues 
are satisfying in this technique:
1. Confidentiality: the technique guarantees that the messages are protected from 
disclosure, which is done by encrypting the messages with original keys that do 
not send through communication channel. Instead, the original keys are sent 
encrypted by fake keys.
2. Integrity: the information is protected from being changed by unauthorized 
parties through using HMAC function which checks if the content of the mes-
sage is altered or not.
3. Undetectability: undetectability is achieved depending on two conditions: 
first, plausibility, the messages that are sent through the covert channel are 
protected from adversary by making the covert channel appear like a normal 
channel through sending normal encrypted messages, and, second, hiding the 
fake key inside the message which does not affect bit distribution, especially 
when the size of the fake key is small.
4. Comparative analysis: My technique is used in two ways, malicious and benign 
usages. Also, encryption and authentication are used that differ from other 
techniques.
5. Dynamically: the generating keys between the client and server have a flexible 
length. Because when you repeat the scenario in Figure 5 several times, you get 
new keys with different sizes. If you repeat the technique four times and each 
time generates key with 16-bit size, then you will get a key with 64-bit size.
Figure 6. 
The technique can handle multiple users in acceptable time.
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The time that is needed by the server to serve the client is measured. The tech-
nique can handle several clients with acceptable time as shown in Figure 6. The 
server needs less than 0.25 s to deal and handle 30 clients.
6. Conclusion and future work
Encryption is used to achieve confidentiality to protect data from stealing from 
the third party (e.g., attacker). If users use encryption, they cannot achieve integ-
rity. They need authentication and covert channel besides encryption technique to 
achieve integrity. In this chapter, we used encryption, authentication, and covert 
channel to produce a secure communication between eligible parties. This technique 
satisfies confidentiality through encryption and integrity using authentication 
algorithm. Finally, this technique generates undetectability covert channel through 
normal distribution of bits. Secure communication channel between the client and 
server that enables them to transfer data securely and to agree on keys that are used 
for future communication. The technique needs pre-shared table that consists of 
original and fake keys.
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